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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Despite previous research in this area, the relationship between immigration and crime in 
the United States remains ambiguous and surrounded by misconceptions. However, 
recently, scholars have suggested that, despite the claims of policy-makers and 
popularized sociological theories, large immigrant concentrations may be linked with 
lower as opposed to higher crime rates. In the past, research in this area has been 
imprecise due to it its implementation of cross-sectional analyses for a limited selection 
of geographic regions. However, through the implementation of time-series procedures 
and the use of annual data for metropolitan statistical areas during the 2005–2010 
periods, the present study evaluates the impact of changes in immigration concentration 
on changes in crime rates, both violent and non-violent. These multivariate analyses 
specify that violent and property crime rates generally decreased as metropolitan areas 
experienced increases in their proportion of immigrants. These results confirm the 
hypothesis that the recent decline in crime is partially due to increases in the 
concentration of foreign-born individuals.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
In recent years, academics have been perplexed by the consistent decreases in 
violent crime rates in the past two decades, even in the midst of an economic recession. 
Meanwhile, immigration has continued to increase and only recently have scholars begun 
to suspect a correlation. The results of recent studies indicate that the correlation between 
immigration and crime has become increasingly negative since the beginning of the 
twentieth century, that there is in fact a causal relationship between increased immigrant 
concentration and decreases in violent crime rates, and that these results are robust for 
metropolitan areas throughout the United States (Stowell, Messner, Mcgeever, and 
Raffalovich 2009). This paper analyzes the relationship between immigration and violent 
crime rates in the United States, using time-series techniques and yearly data for 100 
metropolitan areas over the 2005-2010 period. 
  
The longstanding and broadly held belief that immigration leads to crime is 
misaligned with recent national trends. In reality, as violent crime rates have declined 
considerably, the United States has seen a sizable influx of immigrants.  Since 1990, the 
foreign-born population grew by 28 percent, with an increase of nearly 9 million 
individuals.
1
 However, violent victimization rates in the United States reached an 
unprecedented low in 2008 (Bureau of Justice Statistics 2010). Therefore, the drop in 
                                                             
1 U.S. Census Bureau American FactFinder (http://factfinder2.census.gov). 
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crime rates has been an adjunct to an influx of foreign-born persons. Notably, the overall 
dwindle in violent crime rates is not due to disproportionate declines in one type of 
offense, because homicide, rape, robbery, and assault rates have all experienced sizeable 
reductions.  While, this correlation does not necessary indicate the existence of a causal 
relationship, there is sufficient data and information to test this theory. 
 The purpose of the present study is to analyze the degree to which immigration 
accounts for recent changes in violent crime rates in the United States by developing 
dynamic models with the use of pooled, cross-sectional time-series data for 100 
metropolitan areas during the 2000-2010 periods. This research aims to draw attention to 
the role of increased immigration into the United States in the well noted, but poorly 
comprehended, crime decline over recent years. 
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THEORY 
 
The majority of the present research on crime and immigration developed from 
the Chicago School of Sociology’s social disorganization theory, and this perspective has 
offered the theoretical foundation for research in this area (see Lee, 2003; Martinez, 
2002, 2008; Stowell, 2007).  
Briefly, the social disorganization theory states that structural attributes of urban 
areas, and not necessarily the characteristics of their populace, make them particularly 
prone to participating in delinquent acts (Stowell, Messner, Mcgeever, and Raffalovich 
2009). Additionally, the social disorganization theory identifies three key structural 
attributes (residential instability, economic deprivation, and ethnic heterogeneity) which 
can be used as proxies to measure the extent to which an environment is socially 
disrupted (Sampson and Groves, 1988:780). 
When considering this perspective, it is important to recognize the particular 
emphasis on the perceived disruptive force of immigration. The social disorganization 
theory states that increases in disarray and, by implication, crime rates are more likely 
during phases of large-scale immigration. Proponents of the disorganization theory 
maintain that community expansion and development is destabilized by increases in 
language and other cultural differences that result from a diverse foreign-born population 
(see Thomas and Znaniecki, 1920). Furthermore, unofficial networks of guidance and 
social control are difficult to ascertain because the regions into which immigrants tend to 
settle often posses few resources. Thus, the theory explains why one would anticipate 
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higher rates of crime in areas with a particularly large share of immigrants and especially 
during times with high levels of immigration. 
In contrast with the social disorganization perspective’s contention of a positive 
relationship between crime and immigration, nonempirical research on immigration 
describes the process of immigration more positively and offers knowledge regarding the 
likelihood of an inverse relationship between crime and immigration (Ogbu, 1991). 
A foremost clarification for the observed differences is the selectivity theory, 
which states that people who migrate to the United States do so for the chance to improve 
their life possibilities. Fundamental to the selectivity theory is the principle that “people 
who migrate are more motivated, talented, and assiduous than those who do not” 
(Stowell, Messner, Mcgeever, and Raffalovich 2009). Immigrants are also likely to have 
contact with social networks. These networks are key in that they can “offer information 
and facilitate the move and the process of adaptation” (Palloni and Morenoff, 2001:160). 
Consequently, the assertions the selectivity theory makes concerning immigrants are in 
disaccord with those related to the social disorganization theory. In addition, the 
selectivity hypothesis implies that immigration is not necessarily associated with the 
disturbance of ecological dynamics as noted by the social disorganization theory. 
Therefore, the present study maintains that several theories of immigration provide strong 
reasons to expect an inverse correlation between immigration and crime. 
The present study aims to broaden the level of information on the relationship 
between crime and immigration by addressing the limitations of previous research in the 
area. Most notably, the present study will utilize a longitudinal analytical design to assess 
whether changes in immigration levels are associated with the recent declines in national 
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crime rates. Martinez (2006: 12) states that while studies have yet to establish established 
“a definitive causal connection, ultimately it seems to be the case that more immigrants 
[result in] less violence.” Nonetheless, the existence of a statistical relationship, after 
controlling for social and structural conditions is yet to be determined. Furthermore, the 
present study uses data for a diverse range of geographic areas, which could provide new 
insight into “how nontraditional immigration settlement trends may impact the 
relationship between crime and immigration” (Stowell, Messner, Mcgeever, and 
Raffalovich 2009). 
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PREVIOUS RESEARCH 
 
To analyze this hypothesis, one must first examine the origins of the idea that 
there is a positive correlation between immigration and crime. In Immigration, Crime, 
and Incarceration in Early Twentieth-century America (2009), Moehling and Piehl 
analyze the immigration and crime trends at the beginning of the twentieth century. The 
study used prison population data collected by the Census Bureau which is advantageous 
in that it contains both information on nativity and related factors and contains a census 
of all inmates, making the study representative on a national scale. The disadvantage of 
using the prison census data is that they record events that take place several steps after 
the criminal acts themselves. The discretion involved in each intervening step means that 
the difference in the incarceration rates of immigrants and natives is a somewhat noisy 
measure of the difference in the crime rates of the two groups (Moehling and Piehl 2009). 
The study uses a basic difference in differences analysis using incarceration rates among 
native- and non-native born Americans, which is a simple and appropriate method of 
conducting this analysis given the data limitations. Ultimately, Moehling and Piehl found 
that in 1904, prison commitment rates for more serious crimes were quite similar by 
nativity for all ages, with the exception of ages 18 and 19, for which the incarceration rate 
for immigrants was higher than it was for the native-born. By 1930, immigrants were less 
likely than natives to be imprisoned at all ages 20 and older, but this was not the case for 
violent offenses. The time series patterns display a growing gap between natives and 
immigrants at older ages, one that was driven by sharp increases in the commitment rates 
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of the native-born, while commitment rates for the foreign-born remained relatively 
stable (Moehling and Piehl 2009). 
In Immigration, Economic Disadvantage, and Homicide: A Community-Level 
Analysis of Austin, Texas (2009) by Akins, Rumbaut, and Stansfield examine the effect of 
recent immigration on homicide rates across census tracts in Austin, Texas. The findings 
of this study indicate that recent immigration is not a meaningful predictor of homicide in 
Austin. The authors argue that, given the cumulative weight of the evidence on 
immigration and homicide, the rise in immigration is arguably one of the reasons that 
crime rates in general, and homicide rates in particular, have decreased in the United 
States over the past twenty years, especially in cities of immigrant concentration with 
heighted growth like Austin. Furthermore, findings in this study suggest that violent 
crime in the United States is not caused more by immigrants than the native-born, at least 
at the community level. The authors argue that the link between decreased crime and 
increased immigration is even more applicable to a city like Austin, because of its high 
level of immigration growth.  
Similarly, in Immigration and Violence: The Offsetting Effects of Immigrant 
Concentration on Latino Violence (2009) Felmeyer, studies the effects of immigration on 
violence among Latinos. Unlike the previous study, this study focuses on multiple 
geographic regions. Data on violence and the structural conditions of Latino populations 
are drawn from the California Arrest Data, New York State Arrest Data, and U.S. Census 
data for approximately 400 census locations from 1999 to 2001. Felmeyer comes to a 
comparable conclusion in his study arguing that immigrant concentration has no direct 
effect on Latino homicide or Violent Index rates but may reduce Latino robbery. In this 
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study, immigration also appears to have multiple, offsetting indirect effects on Latino 
violence that work through social disorganization and community resource measures 
(2009). Felmeyer proposes two primary arguments. He first argues that immigrant 
concentration does not contribute to Latino violence and may even reduce some forms of 
violence. Feldmeyer’s study differs from the previous literature in that he concludes that 
immigration simultaneously stabilizes and destabilizes structural conditions in Latino 
populations. He further argues the importance of examining both the direct and indirect 
effects of immigration on crime, the direct effects are increases in violent crimes, and the 
indirect effect is the social disorganization, which he claims, increased Latino 
immigration causes. 
Felmeyer uses Structural Equation Models (SEMs) to examine the impact of 
immigration on Latino violence. SEMs are particularly well-suited for his analysis 
because, unlike ordinary least squares regression, they allow uncomplicated estimation of 
direct, indirect, and total effects of immigration on violence (Felmeyer 2009). 
Consequently, SEMs provide an efficient method for empirically examining mediating 
effects in the immigration–violence relationship and for addressing the social 
disorganization and community resource arguments Felmeyer describes. A possible bias 
in the study derives from the fact that, because the analysis relies on cross-sectional data, 
these relationships may also reflect a tendency for Latino immigrants to move into 
communities with higher or lower levels of disorganization, resources, and violence. 
Furthermore, due to a lack of longitudinal data on Latino immigration, social structure, 
and violence the implications of each of these interpretations may be unclear. Felmeyer 
manages to address this issue to some degree by using immigration measures based on 
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the 1990–2000 period to predict year 2000 measures of community disorganization, 
resources, and violence. 
 In Immigration And Crime In An Era Of Transformation: A Longitudinal Analysis 
Of Homicides In San Diego Neighborhoods, 1980–2000 Martinez, Stowell, and Lee 
(2010) provide the longitudinal analysis lacking from previous papers. This study 
overcomes the limitations of cross-sectional data by exploring the effects of immigration 
on neighborhood-level homicide trends in the city of San Diego, California, using a 
combination of racially/ethnically disaggregated homicide victim data and community 
structural indicators collected for three decennial census periods. The administrative 
neighborhood-level panel data for the three most recent decennial census years and is 
unique among neighborhood-level studies of immigration because it allows the 
researchers to examine social processes over time, a subject that has generated much 
speculation but relatively little scholarship. 
The results of this study show that the increased size of the immigrant population 
reduces fatal violence over time. The authors note that the results are consistent with the 
revitalization thesis which argues that immigration has been inappropriately labeled as a 
cause of crime. More specifically, the study finds that neighborhoods with a larger share 
of immigrants have fewer total, non-Latino White, and Latino homicide victims. Like the 
previous study, this longitudinal study also analyzes the issue of social disorganization. 
The social disorganization perspective argues that levels of neighborhood crime are not 
associated with the nativity or nationality characteristics of their inhabitants. As an 
alternative, the authors argue that social disorganization in heavily immigrant cities might 
be largely a function of economic deprivation rather than forms of “neighborhood” or 
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“system” stability. The “Social Disorganization Theory,” which was presented in a earlier 
presentation by these authors has been referred to as “debatably . . . one of the most 
significant and well-known assessments of the immigration and crime relationship in the 
United States” (Martinez, 2008: 501) 
Accepting the conclusion of the previous studies, that there is in fact a negative 
relationship between increased immigration and violent crime rates Stowell, Messner, 
Mcgeever, and Raffalovich (2009) address the larger question of whether or not the 
increase in immigration in some way has caused the decrease in violent crime rates in 
Immigration and the Recent Decline in Violent Crimes in the United States: A Pooled, 
Cross-Sectional Time-Series Analysis of Metropolitan Areas (2009). This study uses 
time-series analysis and data for metropolitan areas annually from 1994 to 2004, the 
study assesses the effect of changes in immigration concentration on changes in violent 
crime rates. This approach circumvents the limitations of using only cross-sectional 
analysis on a restricted number of geographic locations. The findings of these analyses 
determine that violent crime tends to decrease as metropolitan areas undergo growth in 
their immigrant population. Interestingly, this negative relationship is particularly robust 
for the robbery rates. These results are consistent with other related studies during this 
time period. Tim Wadsworth (2010) argues that under-reporting of robbery crimes in 
neighborhoods where there are higher numbers of immigrants (legal and illegal) may 
explain why this relationship is more ambiguous. Stowell and his colleagues (2009) 
conduct a longitudinal analytical design to assess the hypothesis that changes in levels of 
immigration are correlated systematically with the recent decline in crime in the United 
States. Accordingly, previous scholarly studies also indicate the existence of dynamic 
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impact of immigration on crime. Such as the study conducted by Martinez (2006: 11) 
which maintains that while research has yet to divulge “a definitive causal relationship, it 
seems that more immigrants lead to less violence.” Another advantage of this cross-
sectional analysis is its use of data for a diverse range of geographic areas, which help 
explain how immigration settlement trends could impact the relationship between crime 
and immigration. 
A general problem with each of the previous studies is the inability to distinguish 
between “illegal” or “legal” immigrants. According to the Akins, Rumbaut, and 
Stansfield (2009), “While the undocumented are a difficult group to research, 
[researchers] would expect undocumented immigrants to settle in the same areas with 
large concentrations of legal immigrants” (2009). It is possible that communities 
experiencing high levels of illegal immigration may have higher rates of underreporting 
of offenses as they wish to avoid or risk apprehension and deportation. However, in the 
study of homicidal killings, there is no problem with underreporting bias because killings 
by and of illegal aliens would still be included in homicide counts. The present study will 
also be limited by this haziness in the data; however, according the previous research this 
limitation does not detract much from the overall findings. 
The present study will use a pooled, cross-sectional, time-series analysis of 
metropolitan, similar to that of Stowell, Messner, Mcgeever, and Raffalovich (2009). The 
differences being that the present study will expand the sample size to include the 100 
most heavily populated metropolitan areas in the United States, and differing independent 
variables. Finally, the present study will also aim at more firmly establishing a causal 
relationship between increased immigration and falling crime violent rates, but unlike 
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previous research, it will analyze the effect of immigration on nonviolent crime rates as 
well. The most important difference between this approach and previous research will be 
that due to the availability of recent data, the present study will be able to analyze if 
increased immigration concentration has continued to spur a decline in crime rates in the 
latter half of the past decade, more specifically in the midst of an economic recession. 
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DATA 
 
The data used in the present study are collected from two key resources. The 
independent variables are developed using annual data which is collected by the 
American Community Survey (ACS), as provided by the American FactFinder website, 
and in part, as organized though the MetroTrends website of the Urban Institute’s 
Metropolitan Center. The ACS is an ongoing survey that provides data every year which 
include demographic, social, economic, and housing characteristics for all states, 
counties, townships, incorporated places, tribal areas, census tracts, and census block 
groups. CPS data are particularly useful in this study because the data are available 
annually and at the metropolitan area level.  
The indicators of criminal activity were developed with the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation’s (FBI’s) Uniform Crime Reports (UCR). Specifically, the UCR data for 
2005–2010 was extracted from the FBI’s website. In particular, all crime known counts 
and the analogous population totals, were composed for the 100 metropolitan areas in the 
United States. Using this population criterion, this sample includes 100 metropolitan 
regions (see appendix A). Because immigrants have a tendency to reside in large urban 
areas, the present study’s sample of metropolitan areas consists of a large share of the 
foreign-born population of the United States. Again using ACS data for comparison, this 
sample incorporates nearly 87 percent of all foreign-born individuals who live in a 
metropolitan area and more than 81 percent of all immigrants living in the United States 
(87.3 percent and 81.8 percent, respectively). This established trend clearly specifies that 
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the most heavily populated metropolitan areas continue to draw in and to maintain most 
residents who are born outside of the United States. 
Unlike most of the current studies on immigration and crime, the present study 
does not only analyze the effect of immigration on city-wide or neighborhood levels of 
crime (see Martinez, 2006). While neighborhood-level analyses are important, the 
previous analysis has encompassed a restricted section of the regions in which 
immigrants settle. Moreover, most previous analyses on this subject have been inherently 
cross-sectional. Such restrictions are comprehensible given the availability of data. 
Additionally, crime data for city neighborhoods must be obtained from local law 
enforcement agencies, which is difficult for most communities. Alternatively, data for 
many metropolitan statistical areas from FBI and Census sources are accessible to allow 
pooled, cross-sectional time-series analyses of the impact of changes in the proportion of 
foreign born individuals on changes in crime rates in a given city. 
DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
 
The dependent variables utilized in the present study are the FBI’s reported rates 
of violent crimes including criminal homicide, robbery, forcible rape, and aggravated 
assault, in addition property crimes such as theft and burglary. The violent crime rate is 
the summation of these four offenses, and the property crime rate is the sum of burglary 
and theft.  
INDEPENDENT AND CONTROL VARIABLES 
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The main independent variable used in the current study, immigration 
concentration, is a metric which has been used frequently in previous research. This 
variable is defined as the fraction of the population who are immigrants. The current 
study employs data on several variables which have been formerly identified as variables 
which impact crime rates including: population ; percent of the population who are black 
and non-Latino; percent of the population who are Hispanic; percent of young males aged 
18–24 years; educational attainment (percent of the population aged at least 25 years old 
with a bachelor’s degree or higher); the unemployment rate; percent of total families 
headed by single females or males with at least one child present; poverty (percent of 
persons below the poverty line); home-owner vacancy rate; and the median household 
income. Furthermore, residential constancy has been previously linked to crime and is 
gauged here by those who have recently moved (percent of people who live in a different 
residence than they lived in one year ago). Regional effects are measured by dummy 
variables for the U.S. Census regions (Northeast, West, and South, with Midwest as the 
reference category). Finally, the present study uses the Gini coefficient for income 
inequality which is available at the metropolitan level on the ACS website, in the hopes 
of controlling for the distribution of economic resources within a given metropolitan 
statistical area.  
Many of these covariates which were originally intended to be implemented are 
highly correlated, created a co linearity concern. In order to address this concern, only 
one of each variable likely to have high levels of correlation (i.e. number of single 
parents and poverty rates) are used in the actual regression. All additional variables are 
processed in the regression as single-category covariates. Lastly, all variables (except for 
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the regional dummy variables) are shown as first differences for dynamic time-series 
models.  
 
STATISTICAL PROCEDURES 
 
After conducting unit–root tests it appears as though metropolitan area specific 
crime rates are difference–stationary progressions, for this reason they are in terms of 
annual change. As a result of the large number of cities (100) employed during a short 
time-span (6 years), random-effect variable parameter regression models are employed. 
The present study will perform full-information maximum likelihood estimations. The 
data used in the current study includes 100 cross-sectional units and 5 time points after 
computing first differences and therefore 498 observations.  
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RESULTS 
 
The current study first examines the trends in chosen variables of central interest 
for the selection of metropolitan areas, which is displayed in Figure 1. The top panel 
shows the trend in total crimes committed averaged across the 100 MSAs for the 2002–
2010 periods. In the lower panel, the sample metropolitan areas exhibit a decline in total 
crimes committed through 2010, while the share of immigrants increases steadily until a 
slight decrease in 2007. This trend is depicted in the lower panel of Figure 1. There is an 
observable inverse correlation between these two trends. These straightforward graphs 
hence add credibility to the theory that the immigration expansion has contributed to the 
recent decline in crime in the U.S.  
Figure 1. 
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While this approach addresses most of the shortcoming of previous research, one 
concern is that because we have a downward trend in crime rates (especially violent 
crime) and an upward trend in immigration concentration, it is important to ensure that 
these results are capturing real affects and not just the result of contrasting time trends. 
Consequently, time fixed regression models for various years are implemented for 
comparison. The results of the time fixed effects when analyzing violent crime are 
displayed in Table 1. These results indicate that violent crime rates have been declining 
since 2006 and that the relationship between immigration and violent crime rates has 
become increasingly negative during this time period. 
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Table 1. Time fixed effects of Immigration Concentration on Violent Crime 
 Coefficient 
Percent Foreign-born -13.48* 
(8.82) 
2006 33.21* 
(17.25) 
2007 23.51 
(17.25) 
2008  
2009 -13.72*** 
(1.75) 
2010 -17.45*** 
(6.68) 
Standard errors in parenthesi, 2008 represents base year 
*p<.1;  **p<.05;  *** p.01 
 
When analyzing the time fixed effects for Property Crime, in Table 2, an 
increasingly negative relationship also exists; however, this relationship has much 
smaller coefficients that often are insignificant. This indicates that there is a much 
stronger negative correlation between the immigrant concentration in a city and violent 
crime than to property crime. 
Table 2. Time fixed effects of Immigration Concentration on Property Crime 
 Coefficient 
Percent Foreign-born -3.18* 
(.81) 
2006 8.43 
(7.25) 
2007 3.51 
(2.46) 
2008  
2009 -9.72*** 
(1.75) 
2010 -12.45* 
(8.68) 
Standard errors in parenthesis, 2008 represents the base year 
*p<.1;  **p<.05;  *** p.01 
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Now that the time-series trend in the data has been established, by conducting a 
pooled cross-sectional analysis, one is able to examine this relationship on a more robust 
level. The findings of the cross-sectional analyses are displayed in Table 3. Examining 
the control variables, the story is consistent with hypothetical expectations and previous 
studies. The MSAs with more economic resources usually have relatively lower violent 
crimes rates, whereas MSAs with relatively large black populations in addition to those 
areas situated in the West and in the South have relatively higher violent crime rates. 
The most notable results in Table 3 pertain to the variable representing the percent 
of foreign-born residents in a population. Each of these coefficients is negative, and all 
obtain significance with the exception of the effect on the homicide rate. However, it is 
important to take into consideration the relative size of these variables. For example, one 
can interpret the results for violent crime to mean that for every one percent increase in 
foreign born residents in a given city, on average there will be just over 5 (5.18) less 
violent crimes committed for every 100,000 residents. Considering a city with a 
population of 1 million residents, that would require an increase of 10,000 foreign born 
people to reduce approximately 52 (52.32) crimes. Hence, while negative, this coefficient 
is not necessary large in the context of immigration and crime. However, the importance 
lies in the fact that there is no evidence to support the conception that that a higher 
portion of immigrants necessarily leads to more crime. These results are consistent with 
the recent studies (Martinez, 2002; Sampson, 2006). The dynamic models for violent 
crime also maintain this termination, because even as the relative volume of the 
immigrant population increases there are significant links to decreases in the violent 
crime rates, specifically: robbery and aggravated assault crime rates. 
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Table 3. Pooled Cross-Sectional Regression of Violent Crime and its 
               Components (N = 600) 
 Violent 
Crime Rate 
Robbery 
Rate 
Homicide 
Rate  
Aggravated 
Assault Rate 
Rape 
Rate 
Percent Foreign  -5.18*** 
(.79) 
-1.76*** 
(.35) 
-.07 
(.02) 
-2.87*** 
(.71) 
-.31*** 
(.06) 
Education -9.26*** 
(1.06) 
-2.31*** 
(.35) 
-.11*** 
(.02) 
-6.37*** 
(.83) 
-.04 
(.08) 
Moved within a 
year 
17.86*** 
(1.88) 
3.1*** 
(.68) 
.11*** 
(.04) 
9.45*** 
(1.73) 
1.33*** 
(.17) 
Population .01 
(.01) 
01 
(.01) 
01 
(.01) 
01 
(.01) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
Unemployment 
Rate 
.39 
(2.26) 
1.33 
(.89) 
.19*** 
(.04) 
2.56 
(1.88) 
.56*** 
(.16) 
Poverty Rate 1.16 
(2.08) 
1.18* 
(.69) 
.13*** 
(.03) 
2.19 
(1.83) 
.48*** 
(.15) 
Percent Young 
Males 
13.47*** 
(4.86) 
3.67*** 
(1.5) 
.11* 
(.07) 
7.0* 
(3.77) 
.66** 
(.27) 
Black Non-
Latino 
 
10.44*** 
(.91) 
4.51*** 
(.3) 
.25*** 
(.02) 
4.53*** 
(.86) 
.09 
(.06) 
Northeast -47.89*** 
(14.29) 
-17.72*** 
(5.68) 
.01 
(.24) 
-23.21* 
(13.62) 
-8.92*** 
(1.4) 
South 6.38 
(15.9) 
-39.91*** 
(6.31) 
-.06 
(.27) 
41.94*** 
(16.06) 
-5.05*** 
(1.23) 
West 10.92 
(16.13) 
-9.18 
(6.6) 
1.6*** 
(.31 
8.05 
(16.91) 
-5.26*** 
(1.6) 
      
Constant 52.26*** 
(7.93) 
-16.71*** 
(2.46) 
5.24*** 
(1.15) 
36.22*** 
(6.76) 
29.71*** 
(5.39) 
R
2 
.427 ..488 .535 .332 .349 
Standard errors in parenthesis 
*p<.1;  **p<.05;  *** p.01 
 
In contrast, in Table 4, which measures the impact of immigration on property 
crime, all of the coefficients for foreign-born population yield significantly negative 
results with the exception of burglary rates.  In this analysis, the relative size of these 
coefficients is even smaller than those in the violent crime rate analysis. Nonetheless, 
these coefficients are still useful in establishing the conclusion that a higher relative size 
in immigrants does not lead to higher rates in violent or property crimes, because while 
they are not particularly large coefficients, they are distinctively not positive. 
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Table 4. Pooled Cross-Sectional Regression of Property 
               Crime and its Components (N = 600) 
 Property 
Crime Rate 
Theft  
Rate 
Burglary 
Rate 
Vehicle 
Theft Rate 
Percent Foreign  -13.33*** 
(.5.16) 
-1.76*** 
(.35) 
1.43 
(3.95) 
-11.26*** 
(1.31) 
Education -30.55*** 
(5.77) 
-2.31*** 
(.35) 
-9.95** 
(4.04) 
-7.76*** 
(1.58) 
Moved within a 
year 
116.21*** 
(15.42) 
3.1*** 
(.68) 
58.79*** 
(9.75) 
24.73*** 
(3.83) 
Population .01 
(.01) 
01 
(.01) 
01 
(.01) 
01 
(.01) 
Unemployment 
Rate 
57.02 
(12.59) 
1.33 
(.89) 
42.71*** 
(8.8) 
18.45*** 
(2.97) 
Poverty Rate 50.22 
(12.59) 
1.18* 
(.69) 
35.65*** 
(8.96) 
2.55 
(2.78) 
Percent Young 
Males 
63.19** 
(26.26) 
3.67*** 
(1.5) 
-27.65 
(18.94) 
9.36* 
(5.59) 
Black Non-
Latino 
 
27.38*** 
(4.23) 
4.51*** 
(.3) 
8.52*** 
(3.07) 
8.36*** 
(.967) 
Northeast -588.42*** 
(91.53) 
-17.72*** 
(5.68) 
-347.79*** 
(61.87) 
-69.25*** 
(21.53) 
South -51.68 
(91.8) 
-39.91*** 
(6.31) 
84.71 
(68.57) 
-119.22*** 
(20.92) 
West -134.37 
(105.70) 
-9.18 
(6.6) 
-157.85 
(75.94) 
95.16*** 
(24.29) 
     
Constant 3132.77*** 
(91.53) 
-16.71*** 
(2.46) 
2039.11*** 
(284.98) 
270.39*** 
(84.24) 
R
2 
.522 ..488 .420 .501 
Standard errors in parenthesis 
*p<.1;  **p<.05;  *** p.01 
 
While these tables provide valuable insight into the relationship between 
immigration and crime in the United States, it is certainly insufficient in establishing a 
causal relationship. For example, this table might just indicate that over this time period 
immigrants are moving into low crime areas, or areas into which crime is pre-exultantly 
declining. It is for this reason that it is essential implement a dynamic time-series panel 
analysis. 
Table 5 displays the findings of the dynamic regression. For each dependent 
variable, two equations are shown. The first equation only includes the impact of changes 
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in the share of immigrants on changes in the violent crime rates. In the second equation, 
the control variables are added. The coefficients for the immigrant share variable are 
predominantly analogous across models; therefore the current study will center on the 
findings in the fully specified models. Notably, the coefficients for the foreign born 
population are always negative, and they attain statistical significance for the change in 
violent crime rate variable (–16.21, p < .01), the robbery rate (–10.62, p <.1), and the 
aggravated assault rate (–2.53, p < .1). In short, for these types of crimes, increases in the 
portion of the foreign-born population are correlated with major decreases in violent 
crime rates. 
While the immigration variable produces statistically significant effects on violent 
crime rates, robbery rates, and rates of aggravated assault, these models seem to suggest 
that the impact of immigration on the decline in these crime rates are  modest, making up 
slightly under 7  percent of the crime decline (6.92 percent). This number was calculated 
by measuring the predicted values of the changes for these types of offenses under two 
conditions. In the first condition, the rate of immigration concentration change is set at 0. 
In contrast, in the second condition, the rate of change in immigration concentration is set 
at its pooled average over the selection of MSAs/years. These forecasting models are 
developed so that all of the other variables have been held at their corresponding 
averages. This result is constant across violent crime categories; therefore, the changes in 
the overall levels of violence also averaged to approximately 6 percent. The effect of 
changing immigration concentration is consistent, even if reticent with respect to the 
crime drop in any given year, and is nonetheless nontrivial. 
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Similarly, Table 6 shows the findings of the dynamic regression with regards to 
property crime and its components. While the coefficients for the foreign born population 
are always negative, they are all very small value (with the -6.26 coefficient for violent 
crime having that largest absolute value) and none of these variables are significant. 
Therefore, for property crimes, increases in the relative size of the foreign-born 
population are not strongly correlated with major decreases in property crime rates. 
Accordingly, it is difficult to establish a relationship between the changes in the foreign 
born population and changes in property crime rates. 
The results displayed in Tables 5 and 6 are crucial to the present study because 
the hint at a causal story. Despite the already negative correlation in the cross-sectional 
analysis, the results of the dynamic regressions are still negative. There for despite the 
possibility that immigrants are moving into low crime areas, the decreases in the crime 
rates are even lower than one would expect, and this is especially true for violent crime 
rates. Therefore, it might be the case that immigrants not only offset crime rates, but they 
could be partly responsible for recent declines.
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Table 5. Dynamic Regression of Violent Crime and its Components (N = 498) 
 Change in 
Violent 
Crime Rate 
Change in 
Violent 
Crime Rate 
Change in 
Robbery 
Rate 
Change in 
Robbery 
Rate 
Change in 
Homicide 
Rate  
Change in 
Homicide 
Rate 
Change in 
Aggravated 
Assault Rate 
Change in 
Aggravated 
Assault Rate 
Change 
in Rape 
Rate 
Change 
in Rape 
Rate 
Foreign -17.76*** 
(8.22) 
-16.21*** 
(7.45) 
-2.14 
(4.33) 
-10.62* 
(4.87) 
-.07 
(.06) 
-1.36 
(2.32) 
-.354 
(.284) 
-2.53* 
(1.36) 
-1.67 
(5.41) 
-1.26 
(.87) 
Education  -11.08 
(10.44) 
 2.63*** 
(1.1) 
 -.44 
(2.74) 
 -.01 
(2.84) 
 -.27 
(.33) 
Moved within a 
year 
 2.97 
(5.65) 
 .29 
(.65) 
 .29 
(1.67) 
 .41 
(1.7) 
 .04 
(.2) 
Population  0.01 
(0.01) 
 .01 
(.01) 
 .001 
(.001) 
 .01 
(.01) 
 0.01 
(0.01) 
Unemployment 
Rate 
 9.6*** 
(4.68) 
 4.58*** 
(.57) 
 .51 
(1.47) 
 2.85* 
(1.56) 
 .07 
(.19) 
Poverty Rate  5.41** 
(1.69) 
 0.6 
(.86) 
 2.25* 
(1.01) 
 .90 
(2.18) 
 -.38 
(.25) 
Percent Young 
Males 
 7.43 
(2.43) 
 1.77 
(1.47) 
 7.06** 
(3.63) 
 3.03 
(3.65) 
 -.26 
(.43) 
Black Non-
Latino 
 
 -3.58* 
(2.24) 
 .49 
(.59) 
 .29 
(1.5) 
 -1.74 
(1.54) 
 .03 
(.18) 
           
           
           
           
Constant 3.46*** 
(.92) 
5.09* 
(2.64) 
-1.95 
(4.89) 
0.87* 
(.51) 
.47 
(1.74) 
-1.00 
(1.05) 
-17.45 
(46.72) 
2.04 
(1.45) 
-.17 
(5.41) 
2.48* 
(1.53) 
AR(1) .29*** 
(.11) 
-.06 
(.11) 
.03 
(.03) 
.65*** 
(.11) 
-.07 
(.06) 
-.07 
(.07) 
1.03*** 
(.15) 
.61*** 
(.23) 
.98*** 
(.17) 
.66*** 
(.22) 
-2 log 
likelihood 
10245.93 16694.65 12965.45 18754.0 4382.3 7294.61 4446.35 7020.98 3666.89 5581.54 
Standard errors in parenthesis 
*p<.1;  **p<.05;  *** p.01 
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Table 6. Dynamic Regression of Property Crime and its Components (N = 498) 
 
 Change in 
Property 
Crime Rate 
Change in 
Property 
Crime Rate 
Change in 
Theft  
Rate 
Change 
in Theft 
Rate 
Change in 
Burglary 
Rate  
Change in 
Burglary 
Rate 
Change in 
Vehicle 
Theft Rate 
Change in 
Vehicle 
Theft Rate 
Foreign -6.26 
(16.34) 
-4.59 
(14.29) 
-.15 
(.28) 
-.03 
(.32) 
-.07 
(.06) 
-.77 
(3.47) 
-.03 
(1.39) 
-.21 
(1.47) 
Education  -14.93 
(17.03) 
 -.26 
(.56) 
 -4.33 
(4.03) 
 -.4 
(2.62) 
Moved within a 
Year 
 2.61 
(9.69) 
 .02 
(.34) 
 2.14 
(2.41) 
 -.52 
(1.59) 
Population  0.01 
(0.01) 
 .01 
(.01) 
 .001 
(.001) 
 .01 
(.01) 
Unemployment 
Rate 
 26.12*** 
(9.68) 
 .61** 
(.3) 
 2.58 
(1.99) 
 1.58 
(1.42) 
Poverty Rate  9.11 
(12.76) 
 0.34 
(.41) 
 2.27 
(3.04) 
 -.5 
(1.91) 
Percent Young 
Males 
 16.75 
(20.86) 
 .16 
(.75) 
 8.73* 
(5.22) 
 -2.03 
(3.44) 
Black Non-
Latino 
 
 -5.97 
(8.71) 
 -.25 
(.31) 
 -.6 
(2.12) 
 .18 
(1.43) 
         
         
         
         
Constant -16.88 
(38.05) 
16.75 
(20.86) 
-.44 
(3.14) 
9.01 
(21.81) 
.47 
(1.74) 
11.17*** 
(2.23) 
-9.14 
(15.74) 
-4.11*** 
(1.24) 
AR(1) .99*** 
(.07) 
.74*** 
(.12) 
.01 
(.06) 
.04 
(.07) 
-.07 
(.06) 
.06 
(.19) 
-.04 
(.1) 
-.06 
(.09) 
-2 log 
likelihood 
18052.64 24695.23 8569.45 6247.09 436.61 1720.58 9006.53 4044.87 
Standard errors in parenthesis 
*p<.1;  **p<.05;  *** p.01 
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
A substantial amount of scholarly work has been devoted to the recent and 
unanticipated reductions in crime rates in the United States. However despite the 
attention to this subject, identifying the reason or reasons for this crime decline has been 
difficult. During the same period of time, the foreign-born population has grown in 
record numbers, leading to suspicions that these two developments are not simply 
coincidental. Sampson has proposed that immigration represents a plausible, even if 
counterintuitive, progression that has partially contributed to the recent diminution in 
crime rates (Sampson 2006). The intent of the current study is to evaluate whether there 
is a significant chronological relationship between immigration and crime in the United 
States. Specifically, the current study has analyzed the extent to which changes in 
immigration are related to changes in levels of crime throughout metropolitan areas. 
The result of principal importance in this study is the discovery of an inverse 
relationship between changes in the violent crime rates; robbery rates; and aggravated 
assault rates, and changes in immigration concentration, controlling for other 
demographic and social factors. For the violent crime rate as a whole this effect is 
particularly well-defined and robust. However, for property crimes this negative 
relationship is not as prominent, yet this still discounts the popular misconception that the 
relationship between immigration and crime is overwhelmingly positive. While the role 
of immigration in the general crime decline for the violent offenses is modest, the 
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metropolitan areas with high levels of immigration have been estimated to ultimately be 
much better off than metropolitan areas with relatively low expansion in the amount of 
immigrants in its population. Overall, these results maintain the hypothesis of Sampson 
and other researchers that the robust decreases in crime rates over the past decade are 
somewhat attributable to augmentations in diversity and immigration (Sampson 2006). 
It is important to note that the recent influx of immigrants is unlike those in past 
decades, in both its volume and its ethnic composition. Standing alone, the findings of 
this study may imply that the inverse effect of immigration on crime may be caused by 
the distinctive characteristics of the foreign-born population presently inflowing into the 
United States. In short, that present immigrants, primarily of Hispanic origin, are 
somehow different than those of previous generations. The weight of the evidence does 
not support this conclusion. Alternatively, Hagan and Palloni (1999: 621) present the 
argument that the conception of the immigrant and crime relationship continues to be a 
“topic of popular misperception and policy misrepresentation,” and that this has been the 
case for several years. Therefore, it appears that the findings of the present study coincide 
with many of its precursors in determining that the crime-committing impacts of 
immigration are overstated.  
The current study offers a particular advantage in that it examines the dynamic 
impact of immigration on crime rates in the second half of the past decade. Consequently, 
these results accept more firmly establish a causal relationship, which previously have 
been entirely speculative. The link between immigration and crime is multifaceted, and 
the current study also does not address several issues pertaining to some particulars of 
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this relationship. The following discourse aims to address the restrictions of the current 
study and suggest topics that could be further pursued in this area.  
In integrating national sample and a longitudinal analytical set-up, the current 
study expands present information on if immigration added to reductions in crime in this 
country, yet it does not offer much information into “how” this process functions. The 
methods by which immigration may shield against crime can be described in several 
ways. Perhaps the simplest explanation is a completely compositional result; which is in 
accordance with the immigrant selectivity theory, which theorizes that immigrants may 
be less likely to participate in criminal behavior than the native born. Crime rates should 
therefore decline as the percent of immigrants in a population increases. 
However, another explanation could be that immigration modifies social settings 
in a way that diminishes levels of crime among both immigrants and native born 
residents. Specifically, it could be the case that immigrant communities produce higher 
amounts of efficacy, which then equates to lower levels of crime (Sampson, Raudenbush, 
and Earls, 1997). Information on this subject will be significantly improved by research 
that analyzes the effect of immigration collective efficacy levels over time. 
Alternatively, another possible method for testing why immigration may cause 
less crime is by manipulating structural changes in the regions into which immigrants 
tend to reside. It may be the case that immigration may encourage positive modifications 
in the general character of their inner city communities, which could equate to less crime 
(Bursik, 2006: 26). The “Immigration Revitalization Perspective” developed by Martinez 
seems to coincide with this point, which states that immigration can be instrumental in 
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“encouraging new structures of social development that reconcile disorganizing pressures 
in immigrant communities” (Martinez, 2006). Following this rationale, one would 
anticipate that immigration would have an inverse relationship with several macro-level 
factors associated with crime, such as unemployment and poverty. 
The current study, despite its noted limitations, conductions a formal test of the 
contentious theory that the growing proportion of the immigrant population significantly 
contributed to the decline in crime rates in the United States. Social scientists and 
criminologists alike have been interested in the effect of immigration on society for 
centuries, but the influx of recent immigrants is still regarded in a negative light. While 
public rhetoric on the subject has been incessant, little research has been conducted which 
rigorously tests the dynamic causal relationship between crime and immigration in this 
country. The present study finds that the latest influx of immigrants is strongly connected 
to the recent drop in certain types of violent and property crime. Certainly, while 
immigration is rarely one of the commonly associated factors used to explain the decline 
in crime; this study draws attention to the reality that immigration is in fact a feasible 
explanatory variable. The aim of this study is that these findings may be used to inform 
public consciousness on this subject, and possibly to influence public policy and to entice 
further academic research. 
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APPENDIX A. METROPOLITAN STATISTICAL AREAS EXAMINED 
 
Akron, OH 
Albany-Schenectady-Troy, NY 
Albuquerque, NM 
Allentown-Bethlehem-Easton, PA-NJ 
Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Marietta, GA 
Augusta-Richmond County, GA-SC 
Austin-Round Rock, TX 
Bakersfield, CA 
Baltimore-Towson, MD 
Baton Rouge, LA 
Birmingham-Hoover, AL 
Boise City-Nampa, ID 
Boston-Cambridge-Quincy, MA-NH 
Bradenton-Sarasota-Venice, FL 
Bridgeport-Stamford-Norwalk, CT 
Buffalo-Niagara Falls, NY 
Charleston-North Charleston-Summerville, SC 
Charlotte-Gastonia-Concord, NC-SC 
Chattanooga, TN-GA 
Chicago-Naperville-Joliet, IL-IN-WI 
Cincinnati-Middletown, OH-KY-IN 
Cleveland-Elyria-Mentor, OH 
Colorado Springs, CO 
Columbia, SC 
Columbus, OH 
Dallas-Fort Worth-Arlington, TX 
Dayton, OH 
Denver-Aurora-Broomfield, CO 
Des Moines-West Des Moines, IA 
Detroit-Warren-Livonia, MI 
El Paso, TX 
Fresno, CA 
Grand Rapids-Wyoming, MI 
Greensboro-High Point, NC 
Greenville-Mauldin-Easley, SC 
Harrisburg-Carlisle, PA 
Hartford-West Hartford-East Hartford, CT 
Honolulu, HI 
Houston-Sugar Land-Baytown, TX 
Indianapolis-Carmel, IN 
Jackson, MS 
Jacksonville, FL 
Kansas City, MO-KS 
Knoxville, TN 
Lakeland-Winter Haven, FL 
Lancaster, PA 
Lansing-East Lansing, MI 
Las Vegas-Paradise, NV 
Little Rock-North Little Rock-Conway, AR 
Los Angeles-Long Beach-Santa Ana, CA 
 
Louisville Jefferson County, KY-IN 
Madison, WI 
McAllen-Edinburg-Mission, TX 
Memphis, TN-MS-AR 
Miami-Fort Lauderdale-Pompano Beach, FL 
Milwaukee-Waukesha-West Allis, WI 
Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington, MN-WI 
Modesto, CA 
Nashville-Davidson-Murfreesboro-Franklin, TN 
New Haven-Milford, CT 
New Orleans-Metairie-Kenner, LA 
New York-N. New Jersey-Long Island, NY-NJ-PA 
Oklahoma City, OK 
Omaha-Council Bluffs, NE-IA 
Orlando-Kissimmee, FL 
Oxnard-Thousand Oaks-Ventura, CA 
Palm Bay-Melbourne-Titusville, FL 
Philadelphia-Camden-Wilmington, PA-NJ-DE-MD 
Phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale, AZ 
Pittsburgh, PA 
Portland-South Portland-Biddeford, ME 
Portland-Vancouver-Beaverton, OR-WA 
Poughkeepsie-Newburgh-Middletown, NY 
Providence-New Bedford-Fall River, RI-MA 
Raleigh-Cary, NC 
Richmond, VA 
Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario, CA 
Rochester, NY 
Sacramento-Arden-Arcade-Roseville, CA 
Salt Lake City, UT 
San Antonio, TX 
San Diego-Carlsbad-San Marcos, CA 
San Francisco-Oakland-Fremont, CA 
San Jose-Sunnyvale-Santa Clara, CA 
Santa Rosa-Petaluma, CA 
Scranton-Wilkes-Barre, PA 
Seattle-Tacoma-Bellevue, WA 
Springfield, MA 
St. Louis, MO-IL 
Stockton, CA 
Syracuse, NY 
Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, FL 
Toledo, OH 
Tucson, AZ 
Tulsa, OK 
Virginia Beach-Norfolk-Newport VA-NC 
Washington-Arlington-Alex DC-VA-MD-WV 
Wichita, KS 
Worcester, MA 
Youngstown-Warren-Boardman, OH-PA 
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APPENDIX B.  DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS (N=598)* 
    
 Mean Standard 
Deviation 
% Change 
2005-2010 
Dependant Variables  
(per 100,000 Population)  
 
   
Violent Crime Rate 
Robbery Rate 
Homicide Rate 
Aggravated Assault Rate 
Rape Rate 
 
488.87 
151.25 
5.73 
300.21 
373.23 
180.81 
64.98 
3.30 
134.93 
11.04 
-18.72 
-16.16 
-19.69 
-16.32 
-8.32 
Property Crime Rate 
Larceny/Theft 
Burglary 
Motor Vehicle Theft 
 
3543.22 
2374.50 
790.86 
373.23 
934.61 
596.66 
280.66 
214.37 
-12.36 
-10.39 
-2.56 
-4.39 
Independent Variables 
 
   
Percent first-generation immigrant 
Percent Latino  
Percent in poverty  
Percent with more than a college degree  
Median Household income  
Percent Single Parent  
Homeowner Vacancy Rate 
Percent moved in past year 
Population  
Percent non-Latino black  
Percent young males  
 
11.20 
15.04 
13.15 
28.88 
$52,140 
10.17 
2.38 
16.31 
2,008,949 
12.47 
16.98 
8.00 
16.46 
3.97 
6.23 
9210.69 
2.32 
1.01 
3.10 
2,595,197 
9.42 
1.69 
4.26 
12.26 
5.64 
3.67 
3.56 
9.63 
.23 
1.36 
7.06 
3.87 
2.65 
Constant (N=100) 
 
Frequency  
Northeast 30   
South 46   
Midwest 
West 
 
6 
18 
  
*Due to the usage of first differences, the N for the regression analysis is 598 
 
